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It has tended hitherto to be necessary, when one has written papers 
on the welfare of either the overall Peruvian economy or, more specifi­
cally, the mining industry in the late colonial period, to outline and then 
challenge the deep -  rooted historiographical tradition which identified the 
last fifty years or so of the colonial period as an era of economic decline 
for the viceroyalty of P e ru .1 O n this occasion, thankfully, such an 
introduction would be superfluous, for, it is now generally accepted, at 
least by specialist researchers, that it is invalid to identify the period 
between 1760 and 1810 as one of global crisis for the Peruvian economy. 
Some recent comm entators, it is true, have accommodated this revised 
interpretation grudgingly, and continue to argue, for example, that, even 
if it can be demonstrated that the mining industry increased its 
production, ’’the colony’s other economic sectors -  m anufacturing, 
agriculture, and commerce -  presented a picture of gradual decline 
throughout the eighteenth century.”  ^ According to this interpretation ’’the 
most disastrous blow” was the loss of U pper Peru to the new Viceroyalty 
of the Rio de la Plata in 1776, a step which, together with the revoca­
tion of L im a’s formal monopoly of Spanish South A m erica’s overseas 
trade in 1778, led to Buenos Aires supplanting Lim a as the im porter of 
European goods and the exporter of bullion. An alternative view, and 
one which is both more persuasive, and, as we shall see, supported by 
the fragm entary evidence available on internal and external commerce, is 
that most recently restated by Assadourian and others in their outline of 
a research project on Andean mining from  the sixteenth to the twentieth 
century.^ T heir essential hypothesis is that the mining industry in colo­
nial Peru and U pper Peru was of such dynamic importance to the rest of 
the economy that the significant increase in silver production which 
characterized the period after 1750 necessarily both reflected and acted as 
a stimulus to the general expansion of the late colonial economy.
It remains true, of course, that our understanding of the social and 
economic structures of late colonial Peru is generalized and superficial.^ 
Significant progress is being made, however, as the contributions to this 
volume indicate and it has been reassuring to discover during recent
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visits to Peru both that welcome advances are finally being made in the 
organization of regional archives, and that a new generation of domestic 
scholars is demonstrating an increased willingness to undertake detailed 
research in them .5 M y own contribution to the debate has been to 
provide not a definitve, detailed statement of the state of the late colonial 
economy as a whole -  it will be many years, surely, before any scholar 
will be capable of offering this -  but a general survey of the state of 
the mining industry in the half century between the separation of U pper 
Peru and the obtaining of independence in 1824. T his monograph, 
published in 1977 in both English and Spanish, was based essentially 
upon general documentation in Spanish archives concerning crown policy 
towards the mining industry in the reigns of Charles III and Charles 
IV , and upon the rich but somewhat introspective archive in Lim a of the 
M ining T ribunal, the body founded in 1787 to regulate and promote 
silver mining in the viceroyalty.® O ne is conscious that the study was 
limited chronologically -  it deliberately ignored the p r e -  1776 period 
prim arily because of the immense difficulty of locating detailed data 
about production for the years prior to the inauguration of the visita 
general of José Antonio de Areche and Jorge de Escobedo -  , geo­
graphically -  little attempt was made to examine the continuing links 
between Lim a and U pper Peru -  , and thematically, in that the rela­
tionship between m erchants and miners was hinted at rather than 
analysed in detail. But it was considered appropriate to present the fruits, 
im m ature though they were, of my investigations to fellow researchers, 
partly because they provided a reasonably full account of crown policy 
towards the reorganization and modernization of the mining industry, 
and, thus, could make a useful contribution to the overall appreciation of 
the efficacy of the Bourbon reforms -  and also because of the hope 
that the data therein on silver production, mercury supply, and labour 
would provide a useful framework within which others might pursue 
more systematic research at a  local level.
Before going on to discuss recent historiographical advances, it is 
perhaps appropriate to restate the principal conclusions of my 1977 
research, which was supplemented by two articles: the first, published in 
1976, although written while the monograph was in the press, demon­
strated on the basis of alcabala accounts kept in the Archivo General de 
la Nación, a clear dynamic relationship between the rapid increase in 
silver production at C erro de Pasco, P eru ’s leading mining centre in the 
late colonial period, and the transmission there from the viceregal capital 
of imported European m anufactures.7 It thereby supported the thesis
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that the mercantile community of Lim a benefitted from the expansion of 
mining through its links with the aviadores which enabled it to supply 
both credit and merchandise to the mining centres, whilst holding back 
from the lo n g e r- te rm  investment which characterized the Mexican 
industry in the same period. T he second article, published in 1978, 
adopted a somewhat different approach to the same basic problem of the 
links between miners and merchants, by sampling notarial records in the 
Archivo Histórico D epartam ental of Arequipa to trace ties between 
registered miners and merchants in H uantajaya, the most southerly of 
Peru’s mining centres. It revealed not only links but also a confusion of 
identities, in that the principal mine owners of T arapacá were identified 
as leading residents of P eru’s second city, prom inent as merchants, 
landowners, and magistrates.®
T he first, and most im portant, conclusion which can be drawn from 
my research is that the attempts of the Spanish crown to stimulate the 
mining industry in Lower Peru after 1776 inaugurated a period of 
impressive growth in the industry. The Spanish Crown, recognizing the 
vital importance of silver mining to both the Peruvian and the general 
imperial economics, despite a growing emphasis upon the need for the 
development of agricultural resources, made a determined effort in this 
period, as part of an overall strategy of imperial reform , to modernize 
and revitalize the inefficient mining industry which had been allowed to 
develop haphazardly during the previous two centuries. It did so against 
a background of deep pessimism in Peru about the viceroyalty’s 
economic future following the loss of the mines of U pper Peru to the 
new viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata in 1776.
T he decade after 1776 was devoted principally to an investigation of 
the state of the mining industry in Peru and the formulation of plans to 
reinvigorate it. Areche concentrated upon attempts to improve the supply 
of mercury from Huancavelica, while Escobedo, his more able successor 
as visitador general, paid more attention to the need for basic structural 
reform , which he considered an essential prelim inary to technical 
improvement. T he fundam ental features of his policy were the adapta­
tion of the Mexican mining ordinances of 1783 for use in Peru, and, 
arising out of this, the organization of the viceroyalty’s miners into a 
guild, headed by a mining tribunal, which, from the beginning of 1787, 
was endowed with the basic responsibility for the future welfare of the 
industry. T he mining tribunal operated reasonably successfully in certain 
spheres, such as that of judicial administration, but it failed to improve 
the social standing of the majority of miners, who were generally
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regarded as the inferiors of m erchants and bureaucrats, and it also did 
little to weld them into an effective pressure group. Elections in the local 
deputations and to the tribunal itself were characterized by confusion, 
intrigue and manipulation. Successive viceroys met little resistance as 
they interfered with elections to the tribunal, and, more seriously, as they 
cynically restricted its attempts to use its revenue for the welfare of 
miners as a whole. T he most serious intervention in the tribunal’s affairs 
was that of Viceroy Francisco Gil, who in 1794 closed the exchange 
banks established at the beginning of the decade, apparently so as to 
prevent miners using them  in preference to local silver merchants.
In the sphere of mining education there was no progress. Escobedo 
looked forward in the 1780’s to the establishment of a mining college, as 
suggested in the new mining code, but a combination of offical disin­
terest in M adrid and the stubborn reluctance of miners to consider 
abandoning time -  honoured techniques prevented the opening of such an 
institution. An alternative means of improving the industry’s technology 
was theoretically provided by the Nordenflicht mining mission. T his, too, 
however, was a disastrous failure. Its basic difficulty was that the new 
am algam ation which the Swede, Thaddeus von Nordenflicht, and his 
team  of G erm an specialists were supposed to disseminate in Peru, 
proved, in practice, to be unsuitable for the dispersed type of industry
that had developed there. W ith greater cooperation from the M ining
T ribunal and more imaginative deployment of his G erm an colleagues by 
successive viceroys, Nordenflicht might still have contributed to the
improvement of mining technology in Peru, but the antipathy between 
him and the industry’s representatives intensified the longer he remained 
in the viceroyalty. H is mission continued officially for over twenty years, 
but only because successive ministers in M adrid literally forgot about it 
as the program m e of imperial reform as a whole lost its impetus in the 
reign of Charles IV.
Despite N ordenflicht’s failure to introduce modern European
technology to the mining and refining of Peruvian silver ores, and the 
inability of the M ining T ribunal to promote mining education, the 
industry experienced a prolonged period of expansion in the last quarter 
of the eighteenth century. As Figure I indicates, silver production more 
than doubled in the fifteen years after 1776, and by 1792 it had passed 
the 500,000 marks level. It reached a peak of 637,000 marks in 1799, 
and, although somewhat less buoyant in the first decade of the nine­
teenth century, remained high until 1812. This impressive growth was 
made possible to a certain extent by an improved supply of mercury,
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particulary in the period after 1784. T he increased demand for the 
commodity was met not from Huancavelica, which, after being tempo­
rarily stimulated by the closure of the old royal mine and the granting of 
permission for the working of other deposits around the town, gradually 
became increasingly unable to provide all the mercury required in Peru, 
but by heavy shipments o f  Spanish a n d  Id r ia n  mercury from C á d iz .
F i g u r e i  : R e g is te re d  s ilv e r  p ro d u c tio n  in P e ru , 1771-1824
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Reserves were never large enough to satisfy silver miners, but, in prac— 
tice, there was sufficient mercury stockpiled in Peru to prevent m ajor 
crisis for them during the three periods when w arfare between Spain and 
G reat Britain cut off supplies from the peninsula. (See Figure II and 
T able I)? H ad reserves been greater, or Huancavelica more produc­
tive, silver production, would probably have been even higher, and it 
undoubtedly 'would have been so had the Crown acted before 1809 to 
bring the price charged for the am algam ating agent closer to that 
charged in New Spain.
TABLE I: Peruvian M ercury Im ports 1776 -  1816
YEAR A M O U N T YEAR A M O U N T
1776 4,000.50 1796 1,000
1777 3,968 1797 2,996
1778 5,966.06 1798 -
1779 1,997.86 1799 -
1780 - 1800 -
1781 - 1801 -
1782 - 1802/03 9,930
1783 - 1804/05 7,501
1784 1,998.17 1806 -
1785 - 1807 -
1786 4,002 1808 -
1787 - 1809 5,032
1788 1,500 1810 4,919
1789 8,004 1811 -
1790 4,511 1812 -
1791 3,501 1813 -
1792 2,500 1814 5,044
1793 2,500 1815 -
1794 3,000 1816 2,048 (?)
1795 2,498
T h e  o th e r g e n e ra l fa c to rs g o v e rn in g th e  level o f  s ilv er p ro d u c tio n
were the availability of labour and capital, although the form er was 
perhaps less crucial than many miners believed. They frequently pro­
tested about the difficulty of persuading Indians to agree voluntarily to 
work in the mines, but, in fact, it is clear that the viceroyalty’s 
perm anent force of mineworkers was large in relation to its total popu­
lation. Indian communities in some areas still provided men to perform 
mita service at Potosí and Huancavelica, o r cash compensation to miners 
there instead. But silver mining in Lower Peru was basically dependent
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upon voluntary workers. This did not prevent miners from frequently 
demanding the extension of the mita system to provide them with an 
improved supply of labour, or viceroys and other administrators from 
agreeing to the conscription of Indians for certain projects. T he diffi­
culties in overcoming steadfast Indian resistance to forced work in the 
mines, however, outweighed the advantages to be derived from the 
payment of artifically low wages, and most miners found it easier to 
recruit men on a voluntary basis. Local labour shortages in times of high 
silver production occasionally enabled workers to exploit competition for 
their services, but they usually worked long hours in harsh conditions for 
very small wages.
W ith a few im portant exceptions, the average Peruvian silver miner 
employed about a dozen men and worked a single pit, producing just 
enough silver to cover his costs. The mining tribunal frequently drew 
attention to the fact that in many areas the industry operated almost at a 
subsistence level, and protested that the main reason for its backward­
ness was the fact that m erchants in Peru, unlike in New Spain, were 
simply not prepared to invest capital in basic improvements. T heir 
reluctance to provide long — term investment capital was partly a result of 
the fact that miners were notoriously unreliable at repaying loans, as the 
tribunal itself discovered when it advanced capital to a num ber of indi­
viduals. A more positive reason, however, for mercantile unwillingness to 
invest directly in the industry was that there were larger, quicker profits 
to be made from the investment of capital in the supply of m anufac­
tures to miners. As silver mining expanded, in fact, it provided a 
growing market for imported manufactures, and offered merchants some 
compensation for the loss of their form er lucrative trade with the 
corregidores, following the introduction of the intendant system in 1784. 
As mercantile confidence revived with the expansion of overseas trade, 
particularly in the decade before 1796, capital was also channelled to 
miners through aviadores, although generally on a short -  term  basis and 
at high rates of interest.
T he reliance of the aviadores upon capitalists in Lim a for both credit 
and supplies m eant that the welfare of the mining industry was closely 
related to that of trade. T he general fall in silver production throughout 
Peru after 1812 was partly a product of the economic disruption caused 
by continuing w arfare in Europe and revolutionary activity in South 
America. The most im portant single cause, however, was a sudden 
collapse of the industry at C erro de Pasco, which had emerged in the 
previous twenty years as the leading mining centre in the viceroyalty.
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Cerro de Pasco’s expansion had been made possible by the cutting of
drainage tunnels, which, although relatively near the surface, had
enabled miners there to bring vast quantities of ores to the surface for 
refining. By 1812, however, most of the pits had reached the maximum
depth at which they could be effectively drained by these traditional
socavones, and the result was an immediate fall in production. T he years 
after 1812 saw a continuing decline at C erro de Pasco, and also in most 
other Peruvian mining centres. T he situation deteriorated as mercury 
became increasingly scarce, and, more seriously, as Spanish merchants 
began to ship their capital back to Europe. But, against the general 
trend, one small group of capitalists in Lim a attempted to solve C erro de 
Pasco s drainage problems by importing English pum ping engines for 
use there. W ith the full support of the viceregal authorities, who were as 
aware as the promotors of the company of the advantages to be derived 
from  English technology, steam engines were installed and in action by 
1820. They made an immediate, dram atic impact upon the level of silver 
production by enabling miners at C erro de Pasco to exploit rich ores 
lying beneath the w ater level for the first time, and silver registration at 
Pasco soared to over 300,000 marks in 1820 as a result.
The W ars of Independence destroyed both the steam engines and the 
prospects of renewed expansion for the silver mining industry in Peru. 
It is abundantly clear, however, that, contrary to what many historians 
have asserted, the late eighteenth century, at least, was not a period of 
decline. T he growth of the industry in the late colonial period was 
relatively limited, it is true, in comparison with what occurred in New 
Spain, and its backwardness was still sufficiently evident in 1800 to dis­
courage dream s of economic revolution such as were being entertained 
by the inhabitants of rapidly expanding areas like the Rio de la Plata. 
Nevertheless, it was surely sufficiently impressive to convince Peruvians 
that, despite what many of them  had believed immediately after 1776, 
the viceroyalty had not been condemned to perm anent economic decline 
by the loss of U pper Peru.
Little of importance has been published in the last few years speci­
fically on the mining industry of eighteenth century Lower Peru. There 
have appeared, however, several significant contributions on other 
aspects o f economic activity, and one of their effects has been to further 
erode the interpretation of the period as one of sustained decline. 
Nicholas C ushner’s incisive 1980 monograph on the Jesuit estates of 
colonial Peru, for example, depicts the period after 1700 as one of 
radical im provem ent in the financial position of the Society of Jesus,
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suggesting that this development may be regarded as an indicator of a 
general expansion of the viceregal economy in the first half of the 
eighteenth century.*® H is work also provides a fascinating picture of the 
Jesuit marketing and distribution network for sugar and wine, which 
radiated from Peru to Q uito , the Rio de la Plata, and Paraguay, thus 
rem inding researchers of the existence of a series of overlapping and 
complex economic infrastructures which often rem ain invisible to those 
preoccupied with external trade between Peru and markets further afield. 
A similar function is fulfilled, albeit on a much more limited scale, for 
the p o s t-  1767 period by Jorge Polo’s valuable 1976 study of the 
fortunes of the form er Jesuit hacienda of Pachachaca.** This work, too, 
provides a glimpse of a flourishing agricultural economy, and substan­
tiates the now generally accepted assumption that the separation of 
U pper Peru from  the old viceroyalty did little to damage the importance 
of the Potosí market for the sugar producers of the Cuzco region. 
M agnus M örner’s 1978 study of rural society in the province of Cuzco 
at the end of the colonial period -  an appetizer for his eagerly awaited 
analysis of the historical dimensions of the social structure of southern 
Peru in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries -  is also worthy of 
mention in this context.*'* It, too, provides evidence of the continuing 
and extreme importance of the U pper Peruvian market for the sugar, 
coca, and cloth of Cuzco, as well as confirmation of a clear population 
increase between the late seventeenth century and the late eighteenth 
century. It is interesting to note, however, that the latter process was not 
uniform , and that one of the suggested reasons for the continuing 
migration of indigenous males from certain zones, a process which 
inevitably caused an imbalance of the sexes, was ’’the destructive impact 
of the mining m ita.”*** M ore recently still the pioneering study of Olinda 
Celestino and Albert M eyers on cofradías in central Peru has attributed 
the incessant and increasing judicial conflicts over land titles in the 
eighteenth century in part to ’’the growing pressure of men on the land 
and the demographic recovery which occurred in almost all the 
regions .
Further evidence of the continuing and, indeed, growing vitality of 
the Peruvian economy in the final decades of the eighteenth century is 
provided by recent research into the effects of comercio libre upon 
exports from Spain to America between 1778 and 1796.*"* Throughout 
this period exports through Cádiz were worth on average 76 percent of 
total exports from Spain to the empire, and an analysis of their stated 
destinations provides an interesting measure of the relative economic
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importance of different regions. Predictably, New Spain was the most 
im portant market, absorbing over 40 percent of the goods exported 
through Cádiz in 17 8 5 - 1796; Venezuelan ports took 10 percent, and 
C artagena, the Caribbean port of the viceroyalty of New G ranada, 8 
percent. The Rio de la Plata, served through Montevideo and Buenos 
Aires, emerged as an im portant market for the Cádiz m erchants, its 
share of 11 'percent of their exports being slightly larger than that of 
Venezuela. But the Pacific market, within which silver -  rich Peru was 
by far the most im portant single region, was more im portant in this 
period than Venezuela and the Rio de la Plata put together. It absorbed 
from  Cádiz alone goods with an average annual value of 52 million 
reales (2.6 million pesos) at 1778 value, compared with 26 million reales 
(1.3 million pesos) for the Rio de la Plata, and 24 million reales for 
Venezuela. It is not possible, unfortunately, to calculate the precise 
distribution of merchandise between Valparaíso, Arica, Callao, and 
Guayaquil, for, although virtually all the shipping registers name Callao 
as the single port of destination, a few link it with other Pacific ports 
without providing details of the proportions of cargoes intended for each. 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Peru absorbed the bulk of this 
merchandise, paying for it with the increasing output of its silver mines: 
bullion accounted for 88 percent of its exports to Spain in 1 7 8 5 -8 9  and 
85 percent in 1790 — 94.^® Although substantially more ships went from 
Cádiz to the Rio de la P lata than to Peru, they tended to be small 
vessels, carrying relatively unim portant cargoes, whereas individual 
vessels supplying the more discerning and richer Peruvian market each 
carried goods worth up to almost a million pesos at wholesale values in 
Cádiz. ^  It is clear that Buenos Aires drew some trade away from Lima 
after 1778, but the idea that it supplanted it is a myth, albeit one created 
by the Consulado of Lim a in its vehement protests against free trade. 
In the mid — 1780’s, when the Spanish American market as a whole was 
being flooded with unsaleable goods, its fears were not entirely ground­
less, but the pattern of trade quickly stabilized, and during the decade 
1787 -  1796 exports from Cádiz to Callao were substantially larger than 
those to the Rio de la Plata in every year except 1790. Continuing 
research on the reverse trade, between America and Spain, in the same 
period, is planned, and should add substantially to our understanding of 
the economic effects of the Bourbon commercial reforms in Spanish 
America.
In view of the fundam ental importance of the mining industry to the 
whole economy of late colonial Peru, continuing research into trade and
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agriculture will inevitably throw light upon mining, and vice versa. It is 
also the case that any serious attempt to comprehend the totality of the 
Peruvian economy in this period must take account of the continuing 
close commercial links between the truncated viceroyalty and its further 
dependencies, notably U pper Peru.
T he historiographic picture with regard to economic life in U pper 
Peru has improved considerably. Peter Bakewell’s researches into the 
early history of Potosí have extended, insofar as silver production is 
concerned, as far as 1735.19 O n the late colonial period proper the out­
standing developments have been the appearance of Enrique T andeter’s 
1980 doctoral dissertation on the Potosí mining industry, 1 7 5 0 - 1826, 
and the publication of Rose M arie Buechler’s monograph on the mining 
society of Potosí, 17 7 6 - 1810.20 T andeter’s dissertation ranges widely 
across labour supply, investment and profit, and royal policy. It is 
appropriate to point out that he confirms the assumption that silver 
production continued after 1750 to recover from  its early eighteenth 
century trough, although the industry in Potosí remained dangerously 
dependent upon the state for the provision of labour, mercury, and 
financial subsidies. W hen these props were necessarily w ithdrawn, as a 
consequence of the destruction of the colonial state during the W ars of 
Independence, U pper Peruvian silver mining was left even more exposed 
to the harsh winds of change than the industry in other Spanish 
American countries. T he contraction of U pper Peruvian mining had 
already begun about 1800, it is argued, the decline was accentuated from 
1810, and continued until the 1870’s, despite the somewhat feeble 
attempts of English investors to pick up the pieces in the 1820’s.21
Like Tandeter, Buechler does not attem pt a definitive statem ent of 
the level of silver production in U pper Peru throughout the period under 
consideration. But her figures of purchases made by the Real Banco de 
San Carlos between 1779 and 1820, which must approximate closely to 
total registered production, confirm his suggestion of stable production in 
the 1780’s and 90’s, followed by decline after the turn of the century, 
slow at first and accelerated in the second decade of the nineteenth 
century. Between 1779 and 1788, the San Carlos purchases exceeded the 
registration of silver throughout Lower Peru. T hereafter, as Figure I 
indicates, the output of the Lower Peruvian mines surged ahead, while 
that o f Potosí stagnated and then declined.22 In 1802 purchases at Potosí 
-  205,000 marks -  were only 40 percent of registered Peruvian
production -  505,000 marks -  of which the single centre of C erro de 
Pasco accounted for 283,000. T hereafter, Peruvian output remained
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substantially higher than that of U pper Peru for the rem ainder of the 
colonial period. Both entered upon a period of decline after 1812, partly 
as a consequence of economic dislocation caused by continuing hostilities 
in Europe, partly because of internal revolutionary activity. But whereas 
Potosfs decline continued inexorably, that of Lower Peru was abruptly 
arrested in 1820, as we have noted, as the consequence of the installation 
of the English pum ping engines at C erro de Pasco.
Despite the fact that it contains valuable information on silver 
production at Potosí, Buechler’s meticulous monograph is concerned 
primarily with social history and the general impact of the Bourbon 
reforms in Potosí rather than with economic life as such. A thorough 
analysis is provided of the social composition of the mining guild. It 
demonstrates the complex links between im m igrant silver producers and 
the creole owners of refining plants, who tended to rent their facilities to 
the new arrivals rather than engage directly in large -  scale production. 
T he internal affairs of the guild, it is shown, were characterized on the 
one hand by the factious squabbles for which miners throughout the 
em pire were notorious and, on the other, a  readiness for all m em bers to 
combine with local administrators against interference from both Buenos 
Aires and M adrid.
It seems legitimate to suggest that as a result of this recent work on 
U pper Peru, coupled with one’s earlier researches on Lower Peru, the 
overall level of silver production in both areas has been established with 
reasonable accuracy for the late colonial period. It rem ains true, of 
course, that a considerable proportion of silver actually produced 
undoubtedly escaped registration to enter the channels of contraband 
trade, but it is difficult to find a way of m easuring this phenomenon 
with precision: most commentators reproduce H um boldt’s estimate that a 
quarter of total production was syphoned off.^3
Figures of silver registration, like the even more general data on 
treasury receipts, can offer at best only a  guide to the perform ance of 
the mining industry, and, indeed, can sometimes be misleading. For 
example, the figures presented in John  J .  T ePaske’s fascinating paper in 
this volume on the income of the Lim a treasury seem, at first sight, to 
suggest that the mining industry was more heavily taxed in the 1770’s 
than in the boom period of the 1790’s. But reference to his m ajor 
compilation of treasury accounts for Peru indicates that the yield of taxes 
on mining in other treasuries, notably Pasco, expanded significantly in 
the last decades of the eighteenth century.^4 T he Lim a figures, there­
fore, might be taken as reflecting a relative decline of the mining indu-
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stry in the areas adjacent to the capital, coupled with a greater readiness 
of miners and merchants to do their business with local treasuries.
A nother very suggestive contribution to this volume is that of John  
Coatsworth. O n e’s immediate reaction to this is that, whilst the approach 
is fascinating, it depends upon the reliability and appropriateness of the 
indices used to measure the purchasing power of silver. As fa r as Peru is 
concerned, the principal commodities which miners needed for their 
operations were mercury and labour and their other m ajor areas of 
consumption were in the purchase of imported manufactures, followed 
by local agricultural and viticultural products. T he price for mercury was 
fixed, that of labour fluctuated from region to region and week to week, 
although on the whole there was not a ’’labour shortage.” T he price of 
imported goods probably fell in the 1780’s and early 90’s, while little is 
known of agricultural prices. O ne point to bear in mind here, is that 
many miners were also m erchants and/or agricultural producers, large 
and small. M ining, in other words, can be isolated from the rest of the 
economy, and miners (who ranged from entrepreneurs to subsistence 
producers) from the rest of society, but the processes tend to be arti­
ficial. W hat is clear is that at the moment we simply do not possess the 
detailed data required to establish whether in Peru, for example, the real 
purchasing power of silver or the costs of labour, altered substantially in 
the eighteenth century.
One unanswerable question which is touched upon in the introduction 
to this volume is the extent to which the overall economic structure of 
Peru in the late colonial period reflected and/or provoked regional d iffe- 
rentation. A comment upon rather than a definitive answer to this 
question is that regionalism is certainly one of the crucial features of the 
late colonial political and social structures of Peru, with close identifica­
tion between racial conflict, insurgency, and the general hostility of the 
southern interior, represented by Cuzco, towards the viceregal c ap ita l.^  
T here are some indications that this hostility had in part an economic 
basis, and in this context it is possible, for example, to cite protests from 
mining deputations in Puno and H uam anga against the extravagance 
and inutility of the M ining T ribunal in distant Lim a, and its neglect of 
their local interests.^6 However, mining was relatively unim portant in the 
province of Cuzco, which acted as the focus for this regional discontent, 
particularly after 1810, and one’s general view at this stage is that 
tradition, coupled with racial and social considerations was probably a 
more im portant cause of antimetropolitan sentiment than anything 
specifically economic. It is also feasible that the relative prosperity of the
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late colonial period, a prosperity based prim arily upon the growth of the 
m ining industry, predisposed and enabled the elite in the viceregal 
capital to prefer continuing dependence upon Spain to the uncertain 
future offered by the tentative movements for independence which 
surfaced between 1810 and 1815 and which were characterized, espe­
cially in 1814, by a strong anti -  Lim a bias.
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